Introduction
When Islamic banking was being introduced in Malaysia in the 1980's, the basic strategy was one of replication, essentially transforming the sources and application of funds of conventional banks into Islamically acceptable products. Thus, on the liability side, savings and current accounts became Al-Wadiah accounts, whereas fixed deposits became Mudarabah General Investment Accounts.
On the asset side, short-term loans were redesigned as Murabaha financing, while medium and long-term loans as Bai al Bithaman Ajil (BBA). This strategic choice of moving on the path of least resistance has been a success. Islamic banking has obviously taken root in Malaysia. Having grown at an annual average in excess of 50%, over the last decade, it now accounts for approximately 10% of the country's total banking sector. As an order of magnitude, total deposits within the Islamic banking sector was one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) in 1994. This level of growth is impressive by any measure.
This outstanding growth performance owes much to the initiative of Malaysia's central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), in particular BNM's initiative in establishing the Islamic Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM) in January 1994. The ability to access a money market with Shari'ah compliant products, effectively unplugged the major bottleneck to growth, and the inability of Islamic banks to manage asset-liability mismatches. The near one-hundred-fold 1 increase in market share of Islamic Banks (IBs) since 1994 is probably attributable to the presence of a well functioning money market.
1 Percent of deposits in IBs which stood at 0.1% in January 1994 have now come close to 10% of total.
3 Despite this success, however, many challenges remain. As an Islamic Money Market functioning within a dual banking system, it is in many ways operating in uncharted waters. There is little precedence or experience to draw upon.
This paper examines the issues and challenges that face an Islamic Inter-bank Money
Market that operates within a dual banking system. The paper will argue that even though an Islamic Money Market operates in an interest-free environment and trades
Shari'ah compliant instruments, many of the risks associated with conventional money markets, including interest-rate risks, are relevant to Islamic Money Markets operating in a dual banking system.
The paper is divided into five parts. Section 2 below, describes Malaysia's Islamic
Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM). Section 3, examines some of the key risks associated with money market functions. In section 4, an empirical examination of the extent to which yields in the IIMM are correlated with conventional money market yields is undertaken. The implication of this on interest-rate exposure for the Islamic financial sector is discussed. Section 5 looks at some of the challenges and conclusions.
Malaysia's Islamic Inter-bank Money Market (IIMM)
The money market is a key appendage of the banking system. Banks depend on the money market to manage their liquidity. While liquidity management is not the only use of money markets for banks, it is by far the most important. In fact, banks depend upon and dominate the money market so much, that often they are known as Given the links that the money market has with both the capital market and the banking system, it has become the ideal avenue for central banks to conduct monetary operations. As such, the first impact of a monetary policy change is always felt first in the money market. It is the short interest rate/yield, derived from money market trading, that first responds to central-bank policy implementation.
Adjustment in the bond-cum-equity market and banking system follow the money market reaction. Thus, a well functioning money market properly transmits policy initiatives to the rest of the financial system. Occasionally, central banks may also use the money market for credit allocation purpose. While the money markets of developed nations evolved from the correspondent banking system of the early days, Malaysia's money market -like its Islamic counterpart, the IIMM -were established by fiat, i.e. at the behest of Bank Negara Malaysia. 
The Islamic Inter-bank Market
Before going on to discuss the instruments traded, we take a quick overview of the other two components of IIMM, namely the Islamic inter-bank market and the cheque clearing system. Of the two, the inter-bank market is by far the more important. At the heart of the Islamic inter-bank market is a mechanism known as the Mudarabah Interbank Investment Scheme (MII). This is the mechanism by which Islamic banks can borrow and lend among themselves. Moreover, banks with surplus funds can invest with those with liquidity deficits. As the name suggests, the financing is mudarabahbased with a negotiated profit-sharing ratio. The minimum amount of investment in the MII is RM 50,000. The term of investment can vary from overnight to 12 months.
In the early years of the Islamic Inter-bank Market, the rate of return on the MII used to be based on the gross profit rate on one-year investments that the receiving (borrowing) bank was paying to depositors.
It soon became evident that there was an incentive problem here. It was to the receiving bank's advantage to "declare" a lower profit rate. In a sense, the rates of return were dictated by the returns of the "inefficient" banks. To overcome this 8 problem, BNM revised the rules by setting a minimum benchmark rate for the MII.
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With this revision, the minimum rate of return for the MII was set to equal the prevailing rate of the GIC (Government Investment Certificate) plus a spread of 0.5%.
Pricing the Mudarabah Inter-bank Investment Funds.
Given the above description of the MII, the pricing or cost of funds for a given amount and term would depend on two unknowns:
(i) The profit-sharing ratio (PSR) which is to be negotiated.
(ii) The gross profit rate before distribution of the receiving bank on one-year investments that it will declare. This declaration will be made by the receiving bank at the maturity date of the MII. This means that once the profit-sharing ratio is agreed upon, there is only one unknown, namely the profit rate that will be declared by the receiving bank. However, part of this uncertainty is reduced in the sense that the investing bank knows that it will the higher of the following:
• The prevailing rate on GIC of same term + 0.5% (annualised), if the declared profit rate is lower than this, or
• The declared profit rate adjusted for PSR; if it is higher than the GIC + 0.5%
annualised.
The formula used in determining the (price) profit amount due to the provider of funds (investing bank) is as follows; Appendix 1 provides an illustration of the MII mechanism and settlement.
The Islamic Inter-bank Cheque Clearing System (IICCS)
In addressing the need to establish a separate cheque clearing system for the System is really a sub-segment of the overall cheque clearing system handled by the KLACH (Kuala Lumpur Automated Clearing House).
Islamic Money Market Instruments
In developing the Islamic money market, BNM had introduced a series of Shari'ahcompliant money market instruments. In doing so, the basic strategy was also one of replication. Recall that replication was also the strategy used in introducing Islamic banking. Extending this strategy to money market instruments, common-money market instruments were "Islamised" by removing the interest-bearing feature and
replacing it with either a profit rate or a mark-up feature. Aside from replicating conventional instruments, a number of trading methods/processes have also been adopted from conventional money markets. The best example being, the replication of the highly popular Repurchase Agreements (REPOs) as the Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA). Under the SBBA, following the initial sale at a negotiated price, the parties enter into a separate agreement to reverse the trade at a newly negotiated price.
Pricing of Islamic Money Market Instruments
As IIMM's instruments and processes have largely been structured using the conventional template, the pricing of these instruments by and large, follow the conventional logic of discounting. The key difference being that, whereas the prevailing interest rate of appropriate term to maturity is used in conventional pricing, the profit-rate or mark-up rate is used in discounting Islamic instruments. In fact, even the Ar-Rahnu (RA-i) facility described earlier as being based on the Qard-Al-Hasan concept provides a hibah (gift) which is determined based on average Islamic , about a year after the establishment of the IIMM, BNM had to introduce a minimum required return on MII equivalent to prevailing GII +0.5% (annualised).
This move was necessitated by fact that "there was exploitation by the inefficient banks." 6 Though the PSR is dictated by the investing bank, the profit rate declared at maturity is determined by the receiving bank. The receiving banks were understating profits leading to possible disintermediation of the process. Thus, the need to impose a minimum required rate of return. is only logical that activities in the IIMM cannot be completely detached from the rest of the system. Arbitrage flows would work their way into or out of the IIMM through any of the several linking channels. Since the IIMM replicates of the conventional system, both in terms of trading processes and instruments, any yield differences between the IIMM and the rest of the system would constitute a pure arbitrage opportunity. As such, a well functioning IIMM operating within a dual system would inevitably have yields/profit rates that closely resemble the yields and interest rates in the conventional system. Such synchronicity however, has a huge implication about the relevance of interest rate risk to a supposedly "interest-free" market.
To examine this relevance, an empirical study of the daily quoted yields in Malaysia's IIMM and the conventional money market was undertaken. Specifically, a total of four inter bank yields were examined. These were the daily quotes for the (i) overnight, (ii) 1 week, (iii) 1 month and (iv) 3 month inter bank transactions. The conventional yields are the KLIBOR rates of respective terms whereas for the IIMM, it is the KLIRR (Kuala Lumpur Islamic Reference Rates) of respective maturity. The above equation will be estimated 4 times in each case using the overnight, one week, one month and 3 month rates. Since the null hypothesis tested would be that β = 0, a statistically significant positive value of the Beta Coefficient would imply high correlation between the rates. To see if a causal relationship might exist, the Granger Causality test (2 lags) is used.
Results
Figures 3 to 6 show the plot of the Islamic and conventional rate for overnight, 1 week, 1 month and 3 month inter-bank deposits. The similarity in rates and their comovement is obvious in each and every case. Over the 8.5 year study period, there appears to have been four interest rate regimes. First, a period of sharply declining rates followed by a second period of stable interest rates. This is then followed by a third period of steadily rising rates. The final forth period of about one year, again has stable rates. These four sub periods have been demarcated on the graphs. The comovement of both the conventional and Islamic rates are apparent regardless of the interest rate environment. Table 1 (a) in Appendix shows the correlation by sub-periods. It is obvious from these results that despite being two separate markets, each supposedly with its own "pricediscovery" process, the yields across both markets are strongly linked. These linkages are further confirmed by the results of the OLS regression. Table 2 below is a summary of the results. In all cases, the null hypothesis that β = 0 which would imply that rate formation is different in both markets is strongly rejected. The fact that beta is positive also tells us that changes in both the Islamic and conventional money markets are unidirectional.
While both the above results confirm the existence of very strong correlation between Islamic and conventional money market rates, they do no necessarily prove causality. To test for causality, the Granger Causality tests (2 lags) were conducted.
The results for the 4 pairs are shown in Table 3 below. In all four cases, as Table 3 shows, the hypothesis that the conventional rate does not Granger Cause the equivalent IIMM rate is rejected. With the exception of the one week rates, there is a feedback relationship in the other three rates.
These results are very much in line with the results of Obiyathulla (2004a) . That study examined two variables, the 3 month interest rate offered by conventional banks with 3 month profit rates offered by Islamic banks and Total Deposit rates in the two banking sectors. Using monthly data over a 10 year period, the study found very strong correlation across both sectors for both interest / profit rates and deposits.
Granger-Causality analysis showed strong one way causation from the conventional banking sector to the Islamic banking sector.
It appears therefore, that, as was the case for the banking sector, our analysis of money markets here, also shows strikingly similar results. Despite each sector, • Trade Financing/ Imports A Murabahah based , working capital financing mechanism. The Islamic bank appoints the customer as its purchasing agent for the underlying goods. As agent, the customer purchases the needed goods from the seller (foreign exporter) on behalf of the bank, which pays the seller /exporter and resells the goods to the customer at a marked up price. The customer is typically allowed a deferred payment of up to 200 days. Since, the sale of goods by the bank to the customer on deferred payment constitutes a debt, the debt is securitised in the form of a bill of exchange drawn by the bank on and the customer for the full amount of the selling price. The bank can then decide to sell the IAB to a third party on a Bai al-dayn basis.
• Trade Financing/ Exports An exporter, with an approved IAB facility, prepares the export documentation as required under the sale contract or letter of credit. The export documents, shall be sent to the importer's bank. The exporter then draws on the foreign commercial bank a new bill of exchange as a substitute bill and this will be the IAB. The bank shall purchase the IAB at a mutually agreed price using the concept of Bai al-Dayn and the proceeds will be credited to the exporter's account.
v) Islamic Negotiable Instruments (INI)
These negotiable instruments come in two varieties;
Islamic Negotiable Instruments of Deposit (INID)
Based on the concept of Al-Mudharabah. The underlying asset is usually a sum of money deposited with an Islamic banking institution.and repayable to the bearer on a specified future date.
ii) Negotiable Islamic Debt Certificate (NIDC)
Involves two steps, first, the sale of an Islamic bank's assets to a customer at an agreed cash price. In the second step, the customer resells the asset to the bank at original sale price plus a profit. The bank will pay the customer this new amount at an agreed future date.
vi) Islamic Private Debt Securities
Islamic Private Debt Securities (IPDS) are essentially shari'ahcompliant Corporate bonds. Introduced in 1990, they form the backbone of the Malaysian Islamic Bond market. Most of the IPDS currently outstanding, were issued based on concepts of Bai Bithaman Ajil, Murabahah , al Mudharabah and increasingly al ijarah.
vii) Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA)
Essentially a replication of the conventional REPO, the Sell and Buy Back Agreement (SBBA) is an Islamic money market transaction. A bilateral agreement in which an SBBA seller (seller) , first sells assets to an SBBA buyer (Buyer) at an agreed price. Subsequently, both parties enter into a separate agreement in which the buyer promises to sell back the asset to the seller at an agreed price.
viii) The Commodity Murabahah Program (CMP)
The Commodity Murabahah Program (CMP) is the most recent introduction to the Malaysian IIMM. Introduced in March 2007, it is a commodity based liquidity management tool. The underlying commodity is Crude Palm Oil (CPO) . Under the program, an Islamic bank purchases CPO from a broker and sells it to BNM at costplus. BNM agrees to pay the bank the said amount on a deferred basis and appoints the bank as its agent to sell the commodity. The bank then sells the commodity to another broker and credits the amount to BNM. What has effectively happened is that, as a result of this transaction, the bank has placed out its excess funds with BNM. The same transaction can be done in reverse if a bank is short of funds and needs liquidity. The CMP however, is not currently available in the secondary market.
